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There is, by now, a global consensus that  global warming/climate change is real, and that 
strong actions need to be taken to ensure that the world does not face excessive risk from 
an increase in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse hases.  This is my point of 
departure.   
 
There are five other points of consensus that form the background for this lecture:   
 
(a) Global warming is a global problem, and needs to be addressed globally.  Unless 
all countries participate, there is a danger of leakage; reductions in one country 
may be more than offset by increases elsewhere.2 
(b) Global warming is a long run problem.  We are concerned not so much with the 
level of emissions in any particular year, as with the long run levels of 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
(c) The costs of reducing the level of emissions (limiting the increases in atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases) will be much lower if it is done efficiently.  
Efficiency implies comprehensiveness—we need to address all sources of 
emissions and explore all ways of reducing atmospheric carbon concentrations, 
including carbon storage and carbon sequestration 
(d) There is considerable uncertainty, both about the level of “tolerable” increases in 
greenhouse gas concentrations and the impact of particular policy interventions. 
(e) Global warming is a public good problem, so there is a risk of free riding.  This 
means that there will have to be some system of credible enforcement. 
 
There are four important corollaries of these points of consensus.  
(a) We need a global agreement, and a global agreement will require equitable 
burden sharing.  Much of this paper is concerned with exploring what this entails. 
(b) The shadow price of carbon should be approximately the same in all uses, in all 
countries, and at all dates.  Current arrangements deviate in important ways from 
this principle.  The (shadow) price of carbon in those countries that have signed 
on to the Kyoto protocol is higher than in other countries.  The (shadow) price of 
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carbon associated with deforestation is lower than in other uses.  In many 
countries, the price of carbon associated with renewables, and especially ethanol, 
is higher than in other uses. 
(c) The fact that this is a long run problem with considerable uncertainty means that 
whether we work through emission targets or prices, there will need to be 
adjustments over time. In an emission targets system, we will have to adjust the 
targets.  In a carbon tax, we will have to adjust the tax.   Thus, the standard 
argument that, in the face of certain types of uncertainties, quantity targets are 
preferable to price interventions is of limited relevance.   
(d) We need to differentiate between “systemic risk” and risk faced by market 
participants.  Uncertainties—and differences in beliefs about the nature of the 
risks—in fact provides an argument for mixed instruments, such as the safety 
valve, where, in the short run, there is a cap on the price.  Market participants are 
risk averse, and there is a cost to imposing risk on them.    Intertemporal 
adjustments allow firm and individual risks to be spread out over time, and this 
greatly mitigates those risks.  The fact that what matters is the long run 
atmospheric concentrations means that the environmental costs of any limited 
temporary deviations from pre-specified targets is likely to be small. 
 
There are two more introductory remarks.  The problem we are discussing has many of 
the features of classical public finance.  There is a global public good, global warming.3  
It has to be financed.  Standard theories of public finance provide clear formulations 
concerning equitable and efficient taxation.   
 
Alternatively, we can think of carbon emissions as generating a global externality, and 
again, standard public finance theories discuss efficient and equitable ways of controlling 
the externality generating activity—including the relative merits of corrective taxation 
and regulatory interventions.4  Much of the literature has focused on the equivalence of 
the two systems of interventions, under certain conditions, and much of our analysis will 
make use of that equivalence.  We will analyze tax interventions, because in doing so, the 
efficiency and equity implications become more transparent.  We will then provide the 
interpretation for quantity interventions.   
 
 Secondly, policy is this area—even more than in many other areas of economics—is a 
matter of the economics of the second best.  We cannot even measure emissions perfectly.  
Even governments that are committed to reducing emissions have limited control.  
Emissions are the by-product of every economic activity.  Emissions are not just a matter 
of industrialization:  The methane produced by animals is a major contributor to 
emissions.  We have increasingly become concerned with deforestation, which 
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contributes 20% of the world’s emissions.  But moving to other building materials may 
not help:  5% of the world’s emissions comes from the production of cement. 
 
There is a second important second best consideration.  There are, in fact, two important 
unpriced (or imperfectly priced) resources, (clean, fresh) water, and (carbon in the) air.  
Many of the reform proposals involve, implicitly or explicitly, putting a price on carbon.  
But this may increase the importance of the other distortion.   
 
Bio-fuels provide an illustration of what is at issue.  One of the responses in many parts 
of the world to the threat of global warming is to increase the production of bio-fuels, the 
production of which, in some parts of the world, makes extensive use of already very 
limited supplies of water.5  At the very least, we need to be aware of this distortion. 
Moreover, the increase in bio-fuels has contributed to the increase in the price of food.  In 
this case, the incidence of the (hidden and implicit) tax on carbon is borne 
disproportionately by the poor in the world, since they spend a larger fraction of their 
income on food, while the rich bio-fuel producers and corn producers in the U.S. are 
actually better off.  Global warming would have disproportionately affected the poor in 
the world, but this response puts the burden of adjustment disproportionately on the poor.   
 
One of the reasons that the economics of the second best is especially important in this 
context is that enforcing a global carbon regime will not be easy.  Imagine the difficulties 
of enforcing a global income tax.  Tax evasion would be rife.  Whether we have a global 
carbon tax or a system of emission permits, carbon will have a price, and there will be 
incentives to avoid paying that price.  Over the years, we have come to understand how 
better to enforce taxes; we will need to transfer some of these lessons to controlling 
carbon emissions.    Because the design of the system will itself have distributive 
consequences, we need to discuss this issue before we turn to the issue that is at the 
center of our concern, how to share the burden. 
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In a world with perfect competition, it makes little difference whether we impose a 
tax on producers or consumers.  The incidence of the tax is the same, and the general 
equilibrium which emerges is the same.  Public discussions, however, typically make 
a great deal of the difference, partly because markets are not perfectly competitive, 
partly because transitions from one equilibrium to another are not instantaneous, and 
how the tax is levied can make a great deal of difference in the transition.   
 
In the case of carbon, the focus has been totally on production.  China is being 
“credited” with exceeding the U.S. in emissions (though its carbon emissions per 
capita are still markedly smaller), but many of the goods that are produced in China, 
and which account for considerable amounts of its emissions, are consumed in the 
U.S.  In terms of “consumption” accounting, America is still in the lead.   
 
Whether one uses a consumption or production based accounting makes a great deal 
of difference in the case of carbon, for two reasons.   If one levies a tax (or imposes a 
system which is equivalent to a tax), then how the tax is levied can have large 
distributional consequences.  If a tax is levied on consumption, revenues are 
generated at the point of consumption; if levied on production, at the point of 
production.  In a closed economy, it makes no difference.   
 
Secondly, if some countries are more effective in enforcement—or impose a lower 
tax-- then production, particularly of carbon intensive goods, will gravitate to where it 
is, in effect, taxed less.  In the case of carbon, this is of particular concern, because 
the objective of imposing the tax (restriction) is a global reduction.  As we noted 
earlier, with such “evasion” total carbon emissions could actually increase, as 
production shifts from high tax locals to low taxed locals, if the latter are less carbon 
efficient.   
 
In the design of tax systems, problems of enforcement have taken on first order 
importance.  The argument for the V.A.T. in the advanced industrial countries is that 
the system is self-enforcing, and thus there is greater compliance.  Collection efforts 
can be focused on large firms which generate a large fraction of value added.  Each 
firm in the production chain has an incentive to claim a deduction for goods 
purchased from others, which helps ensure that they reveal their income. 
 
(At the same time, the difficulties of enforcing the V.A.T. uniformly in developing 
countries has provided one of the strongest criticisms for its adoption there.  While 
with full enforcement, such a tax is efficient, in practice, it is highly distortionary—
moving resources out of the “formal sector,” the very sector that most developing 
countries wish to encourage.6) 
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A carbon added tax (CAT), levied at each stage of production, would have some of 
the same advantages that a value added consumption tax has.  Each producer would 
have to show receipts for the carbon tax paid on inputs into its production.  (We 
frame the discussion in terms of a carbon tax; later, we will reframe the discussion in 
terms of a regime of emission permits.)  The taxes levied at each stage of production 
would be passed on to consumers.  It is as if the tax were imposed on consumers; but 
the problem with levying a tax directly on consumers is that there may be many ways 
of producing a good.  We cannot look at a good and infer how much carbon was used 
in its production.  A carbon value added tax will both discourage production in more 
carbon intensive ways and discourage the consumption of carbon intensive goods. 
 
If a firm could not produce receipts for carbon taxes on inputs, then a tax would be 
levied on the input assuming it was made in the least carbon efficient way.  This 
would provide strong incentives for each firm to make sure that its suppliers complied 
with the carbon tax regime. 
 
It would be easy to incorporate countries that failed to go along with the international 
regime.  Producers in those countries would not be able to show carbon tax receipts. 
We could imagine two alternative regimes.  One would follow the procedure just 
described:  a tax would be imposed on the input on the assumption that it was 
produced in the most carbon intensive way possible.  This by itself would provide a 
strong incentive for the country to impose a carbon tax at least on exports.  The cost 
to outside buyers would be the same, but the producing country government would 
garner the revenue.   
 
Since most firms are unlikely to have two production lines—one for exports, one for 
domestic consumption—the tax would provide an incentive for reducing carbon 
emissions.  But if exports are a small fraction of total production, the incentive is 
limited.   
 
This suggests a more aggressive approach, with a compensatory tax on the input 
designed to make up for the failure to impose the tax on output that is not exported.   
 
Under a CAT, it would, presumably, pay the oil and coal exporters to impose a 
carbon tax—a tax in addition to the market price.  But if all countries imposed the tax, 
then that would be the market price.  The point is that, when the government owns the 
natural resource, it is hard to distinguish the “tax” from the “rent” charged on 
extraction—a distinction which is clear when the oil is owned and produced by a 
private company.  Thus, while it might seem administratively simpler to impose the 
tax at the point of production of coal, oil, or gas, or at the cutting of the forest, etc., 
any carbon tax system will have to focus on usage, i.e imposing the tax on the use of 
carbon (oil, coal, gas) at each stage of production.7   
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Thus, there would be a charge imposed on the use of carbon in the production of 
electricity—a charge which would be passed on in the price of electricity.  But there 
would not be a separate charge for the use of electricity.   
 
Emission permits.   
 
The same logic can easily be extended to emission permits.  Permits would be granted 
for producers at each stage of production.  They would be responsible for verifying 
that those from whom they bought inputs did so “legally,” i.e. holding the requisite 
carbon permits.  If the supplier did not have valid permits, then the firm would be 
“charged’ for using carbon on the assumption that the most carbon intensive method 
of production had been used.   
 
Both systems have the advantage of decentralized enforcement.   
 
III. Terrestial carbon and the basic carbon conservation equation 
 
Terrestial carbon provides a particular difficult challenge, both conceptually and in 
terms of implementation.  Conceptually, it forces us to think through clearly 
stock/flow distinctions.  Much of the discussion focuses on emissions, the flow of 
carbon into the atmosphere.  But, of course, what is of concern is the stock of carbon 
in the atmosphere.  To a first order approximation, we can think of the stock of 
carbon being fixed, and 
 
(1) CA + CF + CS + CT + CO = C* 
 
The world’s stock of carbon is either in the atmosphere (which is what we are worried 
about), under the ground, either in the form of fossil fuels or in storage, stored on 
earth (as terrestrial carbon) or in the ocean.  Our concern is to keep CA under control.  
Most of the discussion has centered around limiting the amount of fossil carbon put 
into the atmosphere.  Some scientists are hoping that the development of carbon 
storage technology will allow fossil fuels to be burned and the resulting carbon to be 
returned back below the ground.   
 
It is hard to monitor deforestation.  It occurs at millions of points on the globe.  
Moreover, only part of the wood from a tree that has been harvested will be used as 
fuel, and therefore contributes directly to amounts of carbon in the atmosphere.  
Wood used for furniture or construction enters the atmosphere only slowly, through 
decay.  At the same time, cutting down a forest may lead to far more carbon entering 
the atmosphere than the carbon from the burning itself; carbon can be released from 
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reality of global warming, that it now taking that wealth away from them.  Without this oil wealth, they 
may, of course, need assistance. 
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the soil (from the roots).  Those using wood as fuel should be charged for these 
indirect releases of carbon into the atmosphere; those using wood for long lasting 
construction should be given some credit for the carbon storage.   
 
It may be useful to think about how one might design a system if one could have 
perfect monitoring.  When a tree is cut down, a charge would be made for the indirect 
emissions into the atmosphere.  When the wood is burned, a charge would be made 
for the carbon entering the atmosphere.  And when wood is used for construction, a 
charge would be imposed as the wood rots, and the carbon enters the atmosphere.   
 
In other words, given that our focus is on carbon in the atmosphere, a “toll” would be 
imposed every time a carbon molecule enters the atmosphere on the individual who is 
responsible for it entering—whose action “accounts” for the entry.  (The charge 
would take account of the expected duration of the carbon in the atmosphere—which 
is sufficiently long that it may be approximated by infinity.8) 
 
It should be clear that this “ideal” monitoring is impossible.  We will be looking for 
second best approximations.  One approximation that may do well—at least in the 
long run—focuses on the steady state, making use of the fact that forests are 
renewable. A forest (with a particular tree, cut down in a regular way after T years) 
takes out carbon from the atmosphere and stores it (not only in the tree itself, but in 
the root system.)  In steady state, the tree (and its products) are decaying at the same 
rate that carbon is being taken out of the atmosphere.  We give the forest “credit” for 
the carbon which it has stored (carbon that is not in the atmosphere)—including 
carbon that is stored in post cutting uses (construction, furniture).   Denote by Vi the 
volume of carbon stored in a particular forest (CT = Σi Vi, terrestrial carbon is the sum 
of the carbon stored in all the forests9) 
     
(2)   dCA/dt = - dVi/dt =  ei – si, 
 
the increase in atmospheric concentration of carbon (from this forest) are the 
emissions minus the absorption (storage) of carbon.  In steady state, 
 
 (2)        dVi/dt =  0, 
 
or 
    
  (2a)        ei = si, 
 
emissions are equal to the amount stored.  There is no net contribution. 
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track each.  We care about the average.  If zero (a molecule never leaves), then the entry charge is c/ ρ 
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 Were all of this carbon to be transported into the atmosphere, there would be a 
charge of cV, where c is the price of carbon and V is the amount.  The flow value of 
not being transported into the atmosphere is thus rcV.  In terms of economic 
incentives, it makes no difference whether we charge someone cV for transporting V 
units into the atmosphere, or pay him rcV every period for not transporting it into the 
atmosphere.  If he never transported it into the atmosphere, he would receive cV.   
 
Of course, from a property rights perspective, these outcomes are quite different:  one 
implicitly assigns the right to the owner of the forest to pollute, and pays him not to 
pollute; the other gives him no rights to pollute, and forces him to compensate the 
atmosphere should he pollute.      
 
Land should be used in the most efficient way possible.  Assume that there is a flow 
of lumber of L, and α1L is used for energy, with a value of α1 p1  L.  And α2 is used 
for furniture (or other decaying uses) with a value of α2 p2 L.  Thus, this particular use 
of land generates a (flow) value of 
 
 (4)      rcV + α1 p1  L + α2 p2 L  - z 
 
where z is the (non-energy, non-carbon) cost of maintaining the forest, and r is the 
real interest rate.10   
 
Note that in this formulation, we do not charge for burning wood, because in steady 
state, exactly the same amount of carbon will be (was) taken out of the atmosphere.11 
 
It should be clear that increasing carbon payments (c) increases the return to forests 
usage with high storage.  A higher price of energy shifts production towards uses that 
result in more ‘biofuels.’  Higher prices of lumber shifts production towards uses that 
result in more lumber out.  Better preservatives increase the longevity of carbon 
stored in furniture, so increase both V and (presumably p2, the price paid for lumber). 
 
There is some controversy about whether land should be devoted to forests with the 
highest V or the highest growth rates.  Some forests with tall trees (and thus high V) 
are slow growing, and thus take out little carbon from the atmosphere.  A fast 
growing forest, by contrast, may take out much more carbon from the atmosphere per 
unit time.  Equations (3) and (4) provide an easy resolution of this controversy—and 
suggest neither view is quite right.  In steady state, the amount of carbon taken out is 
equal to the amount of emissions, so the pace of storage is not directly relevant.  (It is 
only that we typically do not measure fully all of the decay.) 
 
                                                 
10 The energy used in the production of energy from the forest is netted out in α1.   
11 And nothing was paid to the forest as it was taken out.  There are some issues of timing (present discount 
values).  We assume that the interest rate is sufficiently small that these can be ignored in this first order 
approximation.  Alternatively, they can be thought of as subsumed in our αp. 
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On the other hand, the rate of growth may be relevant for another reason.  Assume 
that the amount of Lumber (biomass) that we can take out (per acre) from a forest is 
related to the stock of carbon by the growth rate: 
 
(5)  L  = gkV 
 
Some forests have a higher growth rate, g, than others, where we assume that the flow 
of lumber L is proportion to the rate of growth and the volume V, i.e. L =gkV.  Then 
 
  (6)      rcV + α1 p1 gkV + α2 p2 gkV  - z 
 
Other things being equal, a forest with a higher growth rate will generate more 
energy and usable lumber, and thus be more valuable.  But, of course, typically, 
things are not equal.  (6) makes clear that we have to evaluate each plot of land for 
the carbon that can be stored on it, for its generation of energy, and for its generation 
of other lumber products (as well as for the cost of maintenance.)   
 
But (6) also makes clear that it may be a mistake to cut down a tropical forest (with a 
high V), to be replaced by sugar cane, even if sugar cane grows more quickly.   
 
 
Note that if the price of fossil fuels rises (as Hotelling’s formula predicts), then more 
and more land will shift towards forests with a higher renewable energy usage.  In a 
general equilibrium model, the effect will be mitigated by the reduced output of grain, 
which will raise the price of grain.   
 
What is critical, however, is that in changing land usage, the carbon cost is correctly 
included.  Let πi denote the private returns to land usage (per hectare). 
 
(7)  πi = α1i  Li  p1+ α2i Li p2 - zi 
 
where, in this generalized formulation 
 
zi are the costs from activity i 
 
α1i  Li are the non energy outputs, valued at p1 
and 
 
α2i Li  are the energy outputs, valued at p2. 
 
Then, the net social returns are  
  
(8)  Si = rcVi + πi 
 
A change in land usage from i to j induces a change in social profit of 
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(9)  ∆Sij = rc∆Vij + ∆πij 
 
       = rc ∫ δVijt + ∆πij 
 
where the change in the level of carbon storage in moving from one steady state (i) to 
the other (j) is just  equal to the integral of the flows into or out of carbon storage, 
denoted by δVijt. 
 (10)       ∫ δVijt= ∆Vij 
 
The problem with current bio-fuel policies is that, while recognizing that we are 
failing to take account of the cost of carbon in fossil fuels and the advantages of bio-
fuels, we fail to take account of the carbon opportunity costs, which we have 





Controlling climate change entails controlling the limiting value of CA at or below 
some level CA*.  To simplify, let us ignore the amounts of carbon that can be 
absorbed into the ocean or reinjected through carbon storage into the earth.  Then, 
from (1), we can solve for 
 
(1’)    CF* = C*- CA*  - CT*. 
 
This means that in long run equilibrium (ignoring technological change) all of energy 
needs are met by renewables, and the rents associated with the carbon remaining 
under ground are zero.  (1’) has some other (obvious) implications.  The more carbon 
sequestered in forests (the greater CT*) the less carbon needs to remain in fossil fuels, 
i.e. the higher the level of extraction of fossil fuels.  If extraction costs for fossil fuels 
are low, this means that the lower costs for energy (in the intermediate run—in the 
long run, we will still have to rely on renewables.)   
 
 Since costs of extraction increase the more fossil fuel that is extracted, the tax (per 
unit of equivalent energy) on fossil fuel must be t*, such that 
 
(11)      p1* = t* + ξ ( CF*) 
 
where ξ ( CF*) is the marginal cost of extraction when CF* fossil fuel is left in the 
ground.  Letting CT* be the equilibrium terrestrial carbon (= ΣVi), a function of the 
prices for energy, non-energy uses of “lumber,” and the carbon charge t, and noting 
that efficiency implies c = t*, then, from (6), if each parcel of land is allocated to its 
best use, i.e. the use for which12 
                                                 
12 The full dynamic equation is somewhat more complicated that this, since there cannot be an 
instantaneous shift from one land use to another, and since trees are long term investments.  Hence, at each 
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             rt*Vi + α1 p1* gi kVi + α2 p2 gi kVi  - zi 
 
is maximized, then we can solve 
 




(12b)          D(p1*) = ΣigiαiVi = ς (p1*, p2*, t*,..) 
Where ς is the aggregate supply of energy, a function of prices and taxes. In the long 
run, all of the demand for energy must  be met  by renewables.   For simplicity, we 
take p2 (and other prices) in the long run as given. 
 
Substituting (12a) into (1’), we obtain 
 
(1”)      ξ -1(p1* - t*) = C*- CA*  - . χ (p1*, t*). 
 
(12b) and (1”) are two equations in two unknowns, p*1 and t*:  we can solve 
simultaneously for the long run equilibrium price of energy and the equilibrium 
carbon tax.   
 
This analysis assumes that there are static demand and supply functions.  If, over 
time, the demand for energy increases, it would imply that (if p2 and other prices 
remained unchanged) p1 would increase, which would shift land use to more energy 
production and less carbon sequestration (as well as less non-energy uses).  For the 
carbon equilibrium condition (1) to continue to be satisfied, there would have to be an 
offsetting increase in t*.13 
 
Knowing the long run value of p*1 and t*, we can solve backwards for prices of 
energy and the equilibrium carbon tax at each moment of time.  Consider the simplest 
case where there are zero extraction costs, and where we normalize our units so the 
price of fossil fuels is per unit energy, p1.  Then at each date τ,  
 
(13)  p1(τ) = t(τ).   
 
In the long run, there can be no rents to fossil fuels, and that means that at every date, 
there can be no rents (otherwise, there would be an incentive to extract all the oil at 
the moments when it had positive rents.)  Equilibrium is described by a rent function 
and a price function{t(τ), p1(τ)} such that (as before, we take p2 and other prices as 
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(including prices for carbon storage) and taxes (and future interest rates.)   
13 In the general equilibrium, the reduced supply of non-energy outputs would lead to an increase in p2 as 
well. 
12 
given; it is an easy matter to expand the analysis to incorporate the simultaneous 
solution for these as well), given {t(τ), p1(τ)}: 14  
 
(a) optimal land usage generates a supply of terrestrial energy ςτ (..). 
(b) the optimal tax (subsidy) is increasing at the rate of interest, r:  dlnt/dτ = r. 
(c) at each date, demand for energy equals the sum of terrestrial energy plus fossil 
fuel energy 
 
(14)  D(p1(τ))) = ςτ (…) +  κcF 
 
where κcF is the fossil fuel energy, and cF is the addition to atmospheric carbon from 
burning fossil fuel: 
 




(d)  the sum over time of fossil fuel energy equals that required by the carbon 
conservation equation 
 
.(16)  ∫ cF(τ) dτ  = CF* - CF(0) 
 
Over time, land is switched from its current production patterns (which pays no 
attention to carbon storage) to patterns which recognize the social value of carbon 
storage.  Simultaneously, this entails an increase in the price of energy and the tax on 
carbon.  More and more land is switched into uses that do better in carbon 
sequestration, and less reliance is placed on fossil fuels for energy production. 
 
Notice that in this formulation, setting a tighter atmospheric target entails no 
difference in the steady state value of relevant variables.  It simply means that we 
switch from fossil fuels to renewables more rapidly.  This in turn enables us to 
calculate the upper bound of the cost:  An amount of energy, equal to κ∆CF would 
have been produced at zero social costs (zero extraction costs).  Now this energy will 
be produced at a cost of p1(τ) + νt(τ), where ν is the implicit renewable subsidy per 
unit energy produced.  Hence, the upper bound of the cost is just 
 
    ∫ [p1(τ) + νt(τ)]cF(τ)exp {-∫r dz} dτ 
 
over the period during which fossil fuels would have been used under the looser 
regime, and not under the tighter regime.   
 
In the more general case, the marginal fossil fuel extracted, CF*, generates a rent of 
zero asymptotically; but this means that it must generate a rent of zero (more 
precisely, non-negative rent) at each moment of time, i.e. 
                                                 
14 These results can be derived more formally from an intertemporal maximization problem, using a 
standard Hamiltonian formulation.   We assume that there is no short run impact of climate change. 
13 
 
p1(τ) – t(τ) =  ξ ( CF*) 
 
for all τ.  Low extraction fossil fuels are extracted first, and then higher extraction 
fuels.  For a fossil fuel with extraction costs ξ, rents are 
 
     p – t - ξ 
 
and the rate of increase of rents is 
 
     dp1/dτ – dt/dτ / p – t - ξ 
 
 
At date τ, fossil fuels with extraction costs ξ (CF ) will be extracted, where 
 
     [dp1/dτ  - dt/dτ]/ [p – t – ξ]  = r(τ) 
 
where r is the rate of interest.  From the pricing and emissions tax functions, we can 
solve for the carbon utilization (and fossil energy supply) time profiles.   
 
The patterns we have just described do not, of course, accord with observed patterns 
of fossil fuel usage.   We should be extracting first oil from Saudi Arabia (low 
extraction costs) before we turn to higher extraction cost oil (say from Alaska).  The 
fact that we do not do so reflects in part the complexity of the oil industry—the risk 
that we associate, for instance, with reliance solely on the low cost provider; the fact 
that Saudi Arabia may feel that investments not inside its boundaries are risky—and 
hence has an incentive to keep some of its assets below ground.  It reflects, too, the 
uncertainty associated with discovery.  The latter uncertainty would remain, even if 
we resolved the other political risks.  It would mean, for instance, that should a low 
cost supply of oil be discovered some time in the future, we would want to make use 
of it.  If we are to do that—and to obey our carbon conservation equation—it means 
that we have to anticipate that we will want to extract some fossil fuels in the future, 
i.e. given our prior beliefs about the discovery of oil of different extraction costs, we 
set a reservation extraction costs, ξR, such that we only extract oil whose extraction 
costs are lower than that level.  Assume we believed, for instance, that we believe that 
we will be able to continue to discover an amount of oil every period cf(ξR) for the 
next hundred years, after which there will be no more (cheap) oil to be discovered.  
Then, we adjust our “intermediate” target CF* to reflect the fact that we will add an 
additional  amount of carbon ∫cf   over the next hundred years, but that during this 
interim period, we will continue to use fossil fuels in the amount cf(ξR). 
  
 
           






IV. Equitable burden sharing 
 
The key problem today is reaching an agreement is not the science:  as we have 
noted, there is a growing consensus about the minimum that needs to be done—and 
that that minimum is much greater than what the world is doing today.  The problem 
is how to share the burden of adjustment—and adjustment costs are likely to be large. 
 
A scarce resource—carbon in the atmosphere—has been treated as if it were a free 
good.  The market equilibrium which has emerged is, as a result, greatly distorted.  
Many of the key decisions that affect carbon emissions are long run—power plants, 
housing, transportation systems.  Many of the decisions themselves are not totally 
market driven—land usage patterns are affected by zoning.   
 
It is, of course, not just a matter of adjustment costs.  Charging the social cost for 
something that has been treated as free will change relative prices.  There will be 
winners and losers.  The losers will want to be compensated; the winners will be 
reluctant to do so.  In a sense, any change in the scarcity value of any factor of 
production has similar consequences; when these changes in relative prices are driven 
by market forces, we come to accept them—though those hurt are again more 
demanding of help than those who benefit are willing to share their new found gains.  
But this seems somehow different.  For it is a political decision (though no less than 
the enclosure of common land or common knowledge is a political decision.)   
 
If we succeed in ensuring that fossil fuels remain below the ground, then those who 
otherwise would have sold those fuels are clearly worse off.  With a credible program 
on global warming, the owners of oil and coal reserves will see the value of their 
assets diminish—regardless of the design of the program.  The wealth of the oil 
exporters will diminish.  To be sure, there may be limited sympathy—they have done 
very well in the last few years, and unlike wealth that is the result of hard work, 
ingenuity, or savings, it appears to be largely the result of luck.  We should expect 
that countries with large endowments of these resources will do everything they can 
to make sure that there is no agreement.   
 
The same thing is true, of course, not just of countries but of companies—though 
companies have more of a choice.  An important part of their asset base is their skills 
and knowledge.  BP, with its slogan Beyond Petroleum, has suggested than a 
company can transform itself from an oil producer to a energy producers that is not 
dependent on fossil fuels.  Still, responding to global warming will result in a 
decrease in the value of certain assets (just as not responding to global warming will 
result in the decrease in the value of other assets.) 
 
It is worth bearing in mind these within country distributive effects, because they play 
an important role in determining policies.  America’s response to global warming 
15 
may be more determined by impacts on its oil companies and its automobile industy, 
which has been geared towards high oil consuming vehicles, than by a more balanced 
consideration of the country’s national interest.  As a major oil importer, America 
would benefit from the lower price of oil that a global agreement would bring on. 
 
Still, for most of this lecture, as important as these within country distributive effects 
are for political economy, I shall focus my attention on the cross country distributive 
effects.   
 
Much attention has been placed on the inefficiencies in energy usage in developing 
countries.  Increasing energy efficiency will, it is widely believed, reduce emissions.  
This is presented as a win-win situation:  the global environment benefits, at the same 
time that the developing country saves on scarce resources.  But whether increases in 
energy efficiency lead to an overall increase or decrease in emissions depends on 
whether achieving “economic” energy efficiency leads to an increase or decrease in 
the use of carbon (an unpriced resource) in the production of energy, and on whether 
the demand for energy has a demand elasticity that is greater or less than unity.  
While most econoimcally more efficient technologies will be less carbon emitting, at 
the margin, it pays to emit more to save on costs.  And more energy efficiency will 
lead to the price of energy falling; if the demand for energy is price elastic, then there 
will be a more than proportionate increase in energy usage, so that emission levels 
will increase.  Achieving energy efficiency is desirable, but it will not suffice. 
 
 Global societal costs associated with reducing energy emissions can be minimized by 
the imposition of a global carbon tax.  The current price of carbon is zero.  Assume 
that the efficient carbon tax (needed to achieve the agreed upon reductions in global 
emissions) is t*.  Then, the expenditure function for country j, giving the minimum 
level of income required to attain a given level of utility, provides a money-metric for 
assessing the impact of the tax. Let Π(t, p(t)) be aggregate producer profits when the 
carbon tax is t and the vector of prices is p.    Let B(t*) denote the cost of the tax 
 
(17)  B (t*) = E (p(t*), t*, Uo, G(t*)) + Π(t, p(t), G(t)) – [ E (p(0), 0, Uo, G(0)) + Π(0, 
p(0), G(0))] 
 
where p(t) is the general equilibrium price vector that emerges when the price of 
carbon is t, Uo is  the initial level of  utility, and G(t) is the “climate” associated with 
carbon tax t—a global public good.15  Clearly, different countries will be affected 
differently, both as consumers and producers.  We are seeing a glimmer of these 
general equilibrium effects today, with higher fuel and food prices.  There is one 
difference, and that is oil producers are large beneficiaries of today’s high oil prices..  
They would be large losers under a carbon tax.   
 
There is one important aspect of the analysis that we have not discussed:  the 
disposition of the revenue.  Denote the revenue raised by the carbon tax by T(t). 
                                                 
15 This analysis simplifies in a key way:  the impacts of changes in emission levels will be (mostly) felt 
only over the long run.  We thus need a more complete dynamic model.   
16 
Assume country i gets Ti, with ΣiTi = T.  Then (under the assumption that it is 
desirable to have some carbon tax), for t*, there exists an all allocation such that 
 
(18)  Bi (t*) + Ti (t*) > 0. 
 
Indeed, there are many allocations of the tax revenues which can make every country 
better off, and much of the fight going on can be viewed as how to allocated the 
typically implicit tax revenues.   
 
Thus, a system of carbon trading, based on, say 1990 levels of emissions, gives 
emission tax revenues in proportion to 1990 levels of emissions.  That means that the 
US not only gets the single largest allocation, but gets the largest allocation on a per 
capita basis.   
 
(19)  Ti(t) = tE1990(1 – η) 
 
where η is the agreed upon reduction from 1990 levels. 
 
There is no ethical basis for such an allocation.  Indeed, developing countries argue 
that since the North contributed disproportionately to the current build up of 
greenhouse gases, their future allocations should be commensurately reduced.   
 
The developing countries say that they should be fully compensated for the extra 
production costs associated with using more carbon efficient technologies.  The 
discussion so far has not shifted to the broader issue of compensation for the implied 
changes in consumption prices, e.g. for food.  And it typically takes no account of the 
benefits from reduced global warming.  Such considerations  argue that, at a 
minimum, 
 
(20) Ti(t) ≥  Π(0, p(0), G(0)) - Π(t, p(t), G(0))  
 
With the new focus on terrestrial carbon, it is argued that, in addition, they should be 
compensated for maintaining their forests 
 
(21)  Ti(t) ≥  Πi (0, p(0), G(0))] – Πi (t, p(t), G(0)) + rtVi 
 
where now Vi stands for the amount of carbon stored in their forests and c(t)V = rtV 
now stands for the compensation for maintaining a forest with carbon storage V when 
the price of carbon is t.   
 
In this view, global warming is a global public good, and given the large disparities 
between the rich and the poor countries, all (or at least most) of the costs of providing 
this public good should be borne by rich countries.  Developing countries should be 
compensated for providing the valuable environmental services they provide—carbon 
storage—and for the additional costs of reducing carbon—of going beyond energy 
efficiency to carbon efficiency. 
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Note that once countries are charged for carbon, improvements in carbon efficiency 
again do not necessarily reduce carbon emissions; because they lower the price of the 
product, they increase the demand, and if the demand elasticity is high enough, 
overall carbon emissions are increased. Overall impacts on carbon emissions are even 
more difficult to ascertain, because demand for substitutes is reduced, complements 
increased.  If the carbon content of substitutes is low and that of complements is high, 
again total emissions may increase. Such increases in carbon efficiency are still 
desirable; they increase the overall efficiency of the economy system.   
 
An agreed upon carbon tax. 
 
One proposal that has received some attention is that the countries of the world agree 
upon a carbon tax level—a level which would achieve the desired level of reduction 
in emissions.  Each country would then keep the revenue for itself.  In effect, a carbon 
tax would substitute for taxes on work and savings; and under the principle that it is 
better to tax bad things than good things, such taxes yield a double dividend.   
 
Denoting the emissions generated in the country with the price vector p (t) and tax t, 
 e(p(t), t), then 
 
(22)  Ti (t)  = t e(p (t),t)  
 
The appendix explains why, for most countries, we should expect this to suffice to 
provide adequate compensation—so that all countries are better off.  In a sense, the 
distributional impacts are likely to be small.  The “cost” of the carbon tax is the 
difference between the dead weight loss of the carbon tax and the alternative tax (say 
a wage tax).  This number is likely to be small.  But the differential incidence is the 
difference in this difference across countries—a number that is likely to be even 
smaller.  In short, the advantage of the common carbon tax is that distributive 




This is not true of the system of carbon permits.  We have already discussed the 
implicit—and unacceptable—allocation of the Kyoto protocol.  The question of the 
allocation of emission permits is, of course, isomorphic to the question of the 
allocation of tax revenues.   
 
One philosophically widely accepted principle is equal emission permits per capita—
i.e. distributing the revenues equally among all the citizens of the world.  But most 
theories of social justice argue for a more progressive distribution of the revenues 
generated from the “sale” of a global natural resource, the right to emit carbon in the 
atmosphere.    Arguing that those who polluted more in the past have the right to 
pollute more in the future is, to say the least, perverse; and since past levels of 
pollution are related to income, such a rule is clearly highly regressive.   
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The question can be viewed another way, from a more Coasian perspective:  how 
should property rights in the atmosphere be allocated?  Coase, of course, argued that 
it didn’t matter how one assigned property rights; all that mattered for economic 
efficiency was that there was a clear assignment.  Though that proposition has come 
to be questioned, to achieve a global agreement among all the countries will require 
that the developing countries believe that the implicit assignment of property rights is, 
in some sense, fair, or at least acceptable.   
 
Within democratic developing countries today, acceptance of a property rights 
allocation that gives their citizens any less than a proportionate claim is not likely to 
be acceptable.   
 
The “problem” with this rule is that it is feared it will lead to high levels of payments 
from developed to developing countries—at least for the foreseeable future.  To be 
sure, as developing countries develop, differences in per capita emissions will be 
reduced, and so the scope for transfers will be reduced.  A slow enough pacing in of 
emission reductions might hold out the possibility that transfers could be kept to a  
moderate level.  But projections made on the basis of current rates of increases in 
emissions, say in China, may be misleading, for at least two reasons:  (a) Rapid paces 
of technological adaptation may lead to rapid increases in energy efficiency—the 
government is committed to making these changes; and (b) China has been (and will, 
for some time, continue to do so) going through a resource intensive phase of its 
development—focused on expanding housings and cars.  But it will eventually follow 
the pattern of other countries, shifting to the less resource intensive service sector.  
Already, it is discouraging output in energy intensive sectors, particularly energy 
intensive exports (this, in turn, may in part be due to the system of attribution, which 
“credits” China with emissions for products consumed elsewhere.) 
 
There is another problem with most systems of emission permits within countries:  
any system in which the government allocates permits (which is equivalent to 
allocating money) is subject to corruption, either overt corruption, or the more subtle 
form, campaign contributions to induce the political process to adopt a “rule” that 
benefits particular parties.   
 
There is an alternative, auctioning off emission permits.  If the auction is held 
internationally, the system is identical to a system of global taxation in which the 
revenues are pooled together—and the international community must then decide on 
the allocation of revenues (see the discussion above.)  If the auction is held at the 
national level, it is equivalent to the system of an agreed upon tax level, with 
revenues retained by each country.   
 
Of course, the auction undoes one of the reasons given for the permit system:  the 
possibility of receiving large amounts of money (or the protection that it provides that 
mitigation will not make one worse off) has provided political support for (or reduced 
opposition to) taking actions to reduce emissions.  But these political economy 
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arguments for tradeable emission permits are, at the same time,  the main arguments 
against, for allocating a disproportionate number of permits to those currently 
engaged in polluting is the very reason that the poor, who are not currently polluting 
(as much, on a per capita basis), will oppose it. 
 
(There are other arguments for not granting emission permits on the basis of past 
levels of emissions, besides the obvious one that it rewards those with bad behavior, 
going precisely against the “polluter pay” presumption.  In dynamic competitive 
markets, it overrewards these past polluters; new firms, entering the market, will, for 
instance, not have these permits.  It is their marginal costs—including the costs of 
buying the requisite pollution permits-- that will determine market price.  Prices will 
rise to reflect the marginal cost of pollution, so efficient firms are fully compensated 
in equilibrium.  Thus, granting them pollution permits on the basis of past levels of 
pollution overcompensates them.  This may help explain the active support for these 
initiatives by these firms.) 
 
V.  Distortionary approaches to mitigation 
 
So far, we have considered two alternative, efficient ways of reducing emissions:  a 
global carbon tax and a system of tradable emission permits.  Both guarantee that 
there will be a single price of carbon, in all uses, in all countries.  In fact, almost 
every country has deviated from this general principle, by introducing, for instance 
regulations on minimal usage of ethanol (U.S.), minimum fuel efficiency standards 
(U.S.), or providing subsidies to renewables (many developed countries.)   
 
How can these deviations be justified—particularly in the U.S., by an administration 
seemingly committed to free market principles?  There are two bases for arguing for 
these distortionary interventions. 
 
(a) Distributive concerns 
 
The first focuses on distributive concerns, a worry about the magnitude of price 
changes (say induced by the carbon tax) required to elicit the requisite behavioral 
responses.  When there are low demand or supply elasticities, large price changes 
may be required.  A high enough price of carbon would lead to a high enough price of 
energy which, in turn, would lead to the requisite changes in carbon emissions; but 
the effect on the poor could be devastating.  To be sure, one could offset these 
adverse effects, using, for instance, revenues raised by the carbon tax or the 
auctioning of emission permits.  But it is never possible to target perfectly, and many 
may be hurt in the process.  And if the revenues have been committed to “buying” off 
politically powerful potential opponents of emission reductions (for instance, by 
providing emission permits on the basis of past levels of emissions), to compensate 
those hurt indirectly additional taxes will have to be levied; and there is a deadweight 
loss to these taxes. 
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(The problems may be exacerbated if monetary authorities subscribe to simplistic 
rules of inflation targeting; for the large increases in energy prices then induce large 
increases in interest rates, which in turn leads to a slowing down of the economy and 
an underutilization of resources, with especially adverse effects on the poor.) 
 
Regulatory approaches may be able to achieve large reductions in emissions, with 
much smaller changes in equilibrium prices, and accordingly, with much smaller 
distributive impacts.   
 
Part of the argument (for and against) these regulatory approaches may be that the 
impacts are less transparent.  Requiring the use of renewables increases costs of 
production, and leads to higher consumer prices; but it may be harder to link directly 
the price increase with the regulation than in the case  of a tax. 
 
(b) Market failures 
 
The other argument is that markets, by themselves, are not efficient, and government 
intervention is required to achieve efficiency.  There may, for instance, be a 
coordination failure:  builders do not install energy efficient lightbulbs as standard 
equipment, because they know that consumers will be unhappy, since they cannot 
easily replace them in local stores.  And local stores do not stock these lightbulbs, 
because there simply isn’t the demand.  A government regulation requiring all new 
buildings to have energy efficient lightbulbs solves the coordination problem.  Stores 
will quickly perceive the demand, and will stock them.   
 
Innovation is based not only on prices today, but on beliefs about future prices.  
Market expectations may not be rational.  Each market participant may believe that 
there will be a technological breakthrough that will allow the economy to achieve its 
emission reductions with a low carbon tax.  With a low carbon tax in the future, it 
does not pay most firms to invest a lot in carbon reducing innovation.  (It is clear that 
American automobile manufacturers misjudged the probability distribution of 
gasoline.  Shareholders have borne some of the costs of this mistake—but so too does 
the rest of society, when, as a result, there is excessive emissions.  Of course, if they 
had to pay the full costs—though a carbon tax—society would have been 
compensated.  But when a whole industry makes a correlated mistake, it may be too 
big to fail, and not only will there be a reluctance of impose the full carbon costs, 
there may even by a bail-out.) 
 
Of course, innovation almost always entails externalities—there are learning spill-
overs, so that without government support or government mandates, there may be 
insufficient incentives to innovate.   
 
Standard welfare theory begins with the assumption of exogenous preferences.  Yet 
we know that preferences themselves are endogenous, affected, for instance, by 
advertising and social processes.  Government policies can help shape the evolution 
of preferences, and certainly their expression. 
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Not only is there a need for more public transportation, but cities need to be 
redesigned and zones to allow for greater reliance on public transportation.  This is an 
example where market mechanisms by themselves will not suffice:  there is a need for 
collective action.  But changes in the design of cities can, themselves, lead to changes 
in preferences.  There were changes in life styles (and almost surely preferences) in 
America in the 1950s, following the construction of the superhighways; but more 
recently, there has been another change in life style—an increased preference for 
urban living.  Reducing emissions will require changes in the way we live and 
work—including where we live and work and the structures in which we live and 
work.  And government policies may facilitate such changes. 
 
 
VI.  Access to Technology 
 
Efficient utilization of knowledge requires that it be made freely available.  
Knowledge is a quintessential global public good.  But, of course, the patent system 
tries to restrict the usage of knowledge, as one way of compensating innovators.   
 
The deficiencies in the patent system (especially as currently designed in the U.S.) are 
becoming increasingly recognized:  not only does it lead to an underutilization of 
knowledge, it may even have adverse effects on the pace of innovation.16  Here, 
however, we are concerned with another aspect—the distributive impact.  The refusal 
of the U.S.  to transfer technology to developing countries may have large distributive 
consequences.   
 
 If developing countries sign on to a convention requiring them to reduce their 
emissions by a certain amount, by a certain date, they are committing themselves 
thereby to an increase in demand for emission reduction innovations.  If certain 
countries have a comparative advantage in the production of these innovations, such a 
convention can induce large transfers from developing countries to developed 
countries—and it is understandable that they would object.   
 
Assume, for instance, that with existing technologies, emission per unit of output is 
eo.  Assume the country signed an agreement to reduce emissions below the level of 
E*, that the international agreement has sufficient sanctions that the country will 
comply, and that in the absence of commitment, it would have produced an output of 
Qo and emissions of   Qoeo.  To comply with its commitment, the country would have 
to restrict output to E*/eo.   If the new technology lowers emissions per unit of output 
                                                 
16 See, for instance, J. E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, Chapter 4.  The adverse effects arise from 
several sources:  (a)  the patent system gives rise to monopoly power, which lowers levels of production, 
reducing incentives to innovate; (b) the patent system increases the cost of the most important input into 
innovation—knowledge; (c) the patent system gives rise to a high risk of patent litigation, especially in the 
context of the patent thicket—where there is some probability that any innovation will trespass on others’ 
intellectual property. 
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to e1, sufficient that at Qo the country can meet its obligations, then the owner of the 
new technology can extract a rent up to [Qo - E*/eo].   
 
With the developing countries feeling that they have repeatedly been shortchanged, 
not just be colonialism, but also by international agreements (the poorest countries 
were actually made worse off by the Uruguay round), it is not surprising that they feel 
reluctant to sign on to an agreement that might result in large transfers from the 
developing countries to the developed.   
 
Any equitable approach to global warming and to the financing of technological 
innovations which will succeed in reducing emissions requires that the financial 
burden rest on the developed countries.  The developed countries have made a 
commitment to provide assistant to poorer countries of .7% of their GDP.  To date, 
most countries have fallen far short of that commitment.  Perhaps developed countries 
should be credited with some part of the costs of technology transfer. 
 
There are, of course, several alternative ways to finance and facilitate the requisite 
innovations:  (a) public financing and public production; (b) public financing and 
private production, e.g. through a prize system; (c) private production and private 
financing, with developed country governments paying the cost of technology 
transfer.  Almost surely, there will be some combination (though, again almost surely, 
universities and government research laboratories will play a central role.)    
   
 
VII.  National Security, Energy Independence, and Emission Reductions 
 
The analysis so far has focused on conventional economic goods.  Energy, however, 
is so important that many countries—including the United States-- have expressed a 
concern about energy independence.  A cutoff of supplies of energy would have a 
disastrous effect on the country.  Countries can take actions to ensure that there is no 
cut off of supplies within their boundaries, but there is little they can do to protect 
themselves against external shocks.  These concerns are not just a matter of the 
imaginations of security experts, entrusted with thinking though worse-case 
scenarios.  There have been oil boycotts in the past.  Sea lanes for shipping oil are 
vulnerable.  In a world in which a country can, with impuinity, violate international 
level, and invade another, countries rightly worry about their vulnerability.   
 
The problem is that different kinds of energy are not quickly substitutable.  China and 
India have large coal stocks, but must import oil and gas.  Developing an economy 
that relies on imported oil and gas leaves the country vulnerable.  Restrictions on 
emissions (or a global carbon tax) can impose a particularly large burden on such 
countries.  We capture this in our model by positing another public good, S, security; 
the costs of attaining S can be very dependent on t: 
 
B (t*) = E (p(t*), t*, Uo, G(t*), S(t*) + Π(t, p(t), G(t)) – [ E (p(0), 0, Uo, G(0), S(0)) + 
Π(0, p(0), G(0))] 
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It will be much easier to reach a global agreement on global warming, if we can make 







VIII. Concluding Remarks 
 
The world is engaged in a risky experiment, increasing to dangerous levels 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.  Though we may not yet know 
the full consequences of this experiment, the risks are sufficiently great that there 
is a growing concensus that there must be marked reductions in the level of 
emissions.  And given developing countries aspirations of growth—and 
increasing evidence that many of these aspirations will be realized—the 
reductions within the developed countries will have to be all the greater.  The total 
costs of meeting the requisite reductions will depend, to a large extent, on 
advances in technology.  For the last two hundred years, much of the innovation 
in the west has been directed at saving labor; little has been directed at reducing 
emissions.  And why should it have been:  with the atmosphere treated as if it 
were a free good, there were no incentives in place.  This suggests that there may 
be ample opportunities for technological advances.   
 
But the pace of innovation is uncertain, and it would be foolhardy to rely on such 
advances.  It is imperative that the West change, as well, patterns of 
consumption—patterns that regrettably are all too often emulated in the 
developing world.  There is a need for the development of a new economic model, 
one which centers less on the production of emission intensive goods and more on 
other things which individuals and societies value.  Changes in relative prices, 
reflecting the scarcity value of air and water, will help facilitate these changes, but 
so too will other government policies.   
 
This paper has focused on one question which is critical to reaching a global 
agreement on emissions reductions:  how the burden of saving the planet should 
be shared, between rich countries and poor.  There is no question that there will 
have to be global reductions.  That is not the question.  The question is upon 
whom should the incidence of the cost of adjustment be imposed?  Avoiding 
global warming is a global public good.  Standard public finance theory provides 
clear guidance, both about how to achieve such reductions in the most efficient 
way, and how the burden should be shared.  Clearly, the brunt of the burden 
(under virtually any welfare criterion) should lay with the advanced industrial 
countries.  Indeed, these standard ideas suggest that even the approach often taken 
by developing countries—that there should be equal emissions permits per 
capita—puts an excessive burden on developing countries.   
 
One of the advantages of an agreed upon common tax rate (with each country 
keeping its tax revenues) is that it reduces the scope for redistributive deadlock; 
most countries will, in fact, be better off moving from labor or savings taxes to a 




A Simple Model Illustrating the Double Dividend 
 
 
With the warming up of the debate about global warming, and with attention shifting 
from the Kyoto approach of agreed up target levels for reduction to agreed upon levels of 
taxation for emissions (see, e.g. Stiglitz [2006a]), the debate over the “double dividend” 
has arisen once again. (See,e g.    critique of Stiglitz [2006b]).  Several political leaders, 
on both sides of the political spectrum, have argued that it makes more sense to tax bads, 
like pollution, than goods, like work and savings.  The double dividend argument holds 
that not only will pollution be reduced, but there is an additional dividend from the 
reduced burden of taxation from other sources.   
 
The issue has sometimes been incorrectly framed:  the claim is not that measured GDP 
would actually increase, but that there is a welfare gain in the reduced burden of taxation.  
Whether there is this additional benefit, of course, it is still the case that corrective 
taxation is desirable; it is part of an optimal tax structure.  (See Sandmo [   ], Stiglitz [    
].)  The discussion over the double dividend is really a debate about the interpretation of 
the welfare benefits associated with positive taxation of, say, carbon. 
 
In this appendix, I construct a simple but general model which demonstrates the existence 
of both the direct benefit from the reduction in pollution and the indirect benefit from the 
lowering of a distortionary income tax—so long as labor is elastically supplied (so that 
the wage tax is in fact distortionary.)  To highlight the issues, we use a model and 
notation which is somewhat different from that of the text of the paper.   
 
We assume an aggregate production function of the usual form, where output is a 
function of labor, LQ and energy, E: 
 
1) Q = F (LQ, E) 
 
Energy output is a function of labor input, LE and environmental degradation, z: 
 
2)  E = G(LE, z) 
 
Firms maximize profits.  If we choose output as the numeraire,  w is the (real) wage, and 
p is the price of energy, this means 
 
3) FL = w 
4)FE  = p 
5) pGL = w 
 
Initially, no charges are imposed for environmental degradation, so 
 
6)  Gz = 0 
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The representative individual has a utility function of the form 
 
7) U (Q, L, z) 
 
where L is the total labor supply, so in equilibrium 
 
8)  L = LE + LQ   
 
Individuals maximize their utility, and we assume that initially there is a tax on labor at 
the rate t, so that 
 
9) UQ w(1 –t )  + UL = 0. 
 
We can solve the above set of equations for the equilibrium outputs {Q, L, z}, prices {w, 
p} and labor allocations {LE ,LQ}.   
  
We now wish to calculate the effect on utility of a tax on environmental degradation, at 
the rate of τ.  To do this, we substitute into (7) to obtain 
 
U = U(F(L- LE,G(LE, z), L, z) 
 
 
dU/dτ =  U1{ -FL + FE GL} dLE /dτ 
 
           +  {U1 FE Gz + Uz }d z/dτ 
 
           + {U1 FL + UL} dL/dτ 
 
           =   Uz d z/dτ                        the direct environmental impact 
            +   [U1  τFL + UL] dL/dτ        the double dividend effect 
 
          = Uz d z/dτ                         
             +  U1 tFL  dL/dτ                 by Eq. 9        
 
using equations (1) to (8).  The first term, U1{ -FL + FE GL}drops out because of the 
envelope theorem.  Gz = 0 by (6).   
 
In short, so long as the supply curve of labor is upward sloping17, there is a benefit to 
introducing a pollution tax that goes beyond the reduction in pollution itself, from the 
                                                 
17 Actually, what is required is somewhat more complex:  the total derivative of labor with respect to the 
tax rate is given by 
 
 
dL/dτ = (∂L/∂w) [(1-t) dw/dτ  - w dt/dτ ] +  (∂L/∂z) (dz/dτ). 
      +         +/-        +     - 
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reduction in the level of distortionary taxation.  This is so even given the maxim about 
not taxing intermediate goods.  But pollution is both an input into an intermediate good 









                                                                                                                                                 
The first term is the standard supply elasticity, which we assume is positive.  The second and third term 
reflects general equilibrium effects;  the increase in the pollution tax has  general equilibrium effects on the 
level of pollution (it is designed to reduce it) and on wages.  Labor supply is obviously sensitive to the level 
of wages, less so to the level of pollution.  Our analysis simply requires that  
 
(∂L/∂w) [(1-t) dw/dτ  - w dt/dτ ] +  (∂L/∂z) (dz/dτ)  ≥ 0.   
 
Ignoring for the moment the effect of the environment (or assuming that an improvement in the 
environment leads to an increase in labor supply), this means that if the real wage falls, the magnitude of 
the fall is limited.  This might not be the case if the pollution tax leads (as expected) to a reduction in the 
production of energy, and the reduced input of energy has an enormously negative effect on the marginal 
product of labor.  But if, for instance, the effect of the pollution tax is that more labor is spent on pollution 
control, and if labor and energy are substitutes  in production, then it is impossible for the after tax wage to 
fall.  For if the after tax wage were to fall, both the reduced labor input into production and the reduced 
energy input would lead to an increase in the marginal product of labor:) 
 
   dw =  FLL d(L – LE) + FLG dG  >  0, 
                    -        -     +         -        
contrary to the hypothesis that the wage went down.  While it is clear that there may be circumstances in 
which the double dividend does not appear, these would appear to be unusual.  Of course, when the “double 
dividend” term is negative, it simply means that the optimal tax on pollution is less than it otherwise would 
have been.  The general point is that one does have to pay attention to effects of the reduced tax on labor; it 
is only that the combination of a tax on pollution and a reduced tax on labor could, perversely, somehow 
lead to a reduction in the labor supply so that revenue that was previously generated by the income tax is 
reduced.   
SHARING THE BURDEN OF 
SAVING THE PLANET:
GLOBAL SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT






• Global warming is a global problem, and need to be addressed 
globally.  
– Unless all countries participate, there is a danger of leakage; 
reductions in one country may be more than offset by increases 
elsewhere.
• Global warming is a long run problem.  
– We are concerned not so much with the level of emissions in any 
particular year, as with the long run levels of atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases.
• The costs of reducing the level of emissions (limiting the 
increases in atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases) will
be much lower if it is done efficiently. 
– Efficiency implies comprehensiveness—
• all sources of emissions
• All countries
• all ways of reducing atmospheric carbon concentrations, including carbon 
storage and carbon sequestration
• There is considerable uncertainty, both 
about the level of “tolerable” increases in 
greenhouse gas concentrations and the 
impact of particular policy interventions.
• Global warming is a public good 
problem, so there is a risk of free riding
– there will have to be some system of 
credible enforcement 
two important corollaries 
• We need a global agreement, and a global 
agreement will require equitable burden 
sharing 
• The shadow price of carbon should be 
approximately the same in all uses, in all 
countries, and at all dates.
Current policies deviate from this 
principle
• The (shadow) price of carbon in those 
countries that have signed on to the Kyoto 
protocol is higher than in other countries 
• The (shadow) price of carbon associated with 
deforestation is lower than in other uses 
• In many countries, the price of carbon 
associated with renewables, and especially 
ethanol, is higher than in other uses.
This can be viewed as a standard 
problem in public finance
• There is a global public good, global warming.
• It has to be financed.  
• Standard theories of public finance provide clear 
formulations concerning equitable and efficient 
taxation
– Importance of transactions (enforcement) costs
– Importance of compliance
– Importance of second best considerations
– Complexities of incidence analysis
• These concerns affect
– Choice of instruments (taxation, regulation)
– Design
– And what is appropriate for one country, one 
situation may not be for others
• VAT is a distortionary tax in most developing 
countries, because enforcement is incomplete
• VAT is inequitable
• But in developed countries, VAT has some 
advantages in transactions costs, compliance
Bio-fuels:  an example
• One of the responses in many parts of the world to the threat of
global warming is to increase the production of bio-fuels
– in some parts of the world, makes extensive use of already very limited 
supplies of water—which are unpriced:  this distortion is increased
– in the United States have taken advantage of global warming concerns 
to increase the magnitude of their subsidies
– the increase in bio-fuels has contributed to the increase in the price of 
food
• the incidence of the (hidden and implicit) tax on carbon is borne 
disproportionately by the poor in the world, since they spend a larger fraction 
of their income on food, while the rich bio-fuel producers and corn producers 
in the U.S. are actually better off
• Problem exacerbated by inflation targeting central banks. 
• Global warming would have disproportionately affected the poor in 
the world, but this response puts the burden of adjustment 
disproportionately on the poor. 
Standard Tax Theory
• In competitive models, it makes no difference 
whether one taxes the consumption of a good or 
the production of a good
– But there may be different transactions costs, 
compliance
• Current Carbon regime focuses on production
– But does it make sense to “credit” developing 
countries with carbon content of goods that are 
consumed in developed countries?
– With incomplete enforcement, leads to shifting of 
production
Alternative proposals
• Carbon Added Tax—could be 
implemented in a way similar to a VAT
– Double check—at production and at final point 
of sale
– Way of implementing cross-border 
adjustments, ensuring compliance
– But higher transactions costs than just 
imposing a tax on oil, gas, and coal
Cap and Trade
• Easy to implement for major sources of 
emissions
• But harder to implement for multitude of 
small sources
– Giving rise to distortions, transactions costs
Allocating Emission Rights
• Key problem:  how to allocate emission rights
– Valuable asset—worth perhaps $2 trillion annually 
(5% of global GDP)
– Within countries—subject to corruption
– Major stumbling block in reaching global agreement
– And attempt to avoid taking on full implications one of 
reasons for distortionary policies (carbon in different 
uses priced differently)
– Kyoto principle fatally flawed
• More emission rights to those that emitted more in the past
• Violates principle of polluter pay
• Won’t be accepted by developing countries
• Not consistent with any ethical principle
• So far, only serious defensible principle is 
equal emission rights per capita
– Adjusted for past emissions
• Important not to have a process of slowly phasing 
in emission rights—increases inequities associated 
with past emissions
– But this may entail large redistributions
• Larger than are politically acceptable
• Though not clear why this should be treated 
differently than other property rights
• Argument that cap and trade is better than 
tax system because of uncertainty is 
flawed, in the context of long run problem
– In any case, there will have to be adjustments
• In targets (caps)
• In taxes
A common carbon tax
• Better to tax bad things than good
– Double dividend
• More limited distributive consequences
– Impact on each country is difference in 
harberger triangles of two taxes
– Differences in impacts are related to 
differences in these differences
– Likely to be small
• If permits are auctioned, then, except for 
enforcement costs, compliance (ensuring that 
each polluter actually has requisite permit) two 
systems can both achieve efficient emission 
reductions
– Auctioning brings to the fore the distributional 
questions—how are proceeds to be divided
• Standard welfare theories provide clear guidance—should be 
distributed to poorest individuals in poorest countries
• Large pool of money to be used to finance global public 
goods
– Including financing research to reduce emissions and for 
carbon sequestration
Carbon Conservation Equation
(1) CA + CF + CS + CT + CO = C*
Total carbon is equal to atmospheric carbon, carbon stored 
in fossil fuels below the ground, carbon stored in other 
forms below the ground, carbon stored in terrestial
carbon, and carbon stored in the ocean
Ignoring, for the moment, carbon stored in the ocean and 
below the ground in other ways
(1’)    CF* = C*- CA*  - CT* 
If there is a limit to the atmospheric carbon, then the more 
carbon we store in terrestial carbon, the more energy 
we can extract from fossil fuels
Eventually, there needs to be reliance on renewables
Pricing Carbon Sequestration
In long term equilibrium,
(2a)        ei = si,
Emissions from a forest equal carbon
sequestration
Land use determined to maximize
(4) rcV + α1 p1  L + α2 p2 L  - z
Flow lumber of L of which α1L is used for energy, 
with a value of α1 p1  L;  α2 is used for 
“furniture” (or other decaying uses) with a 
value of α2 p2 L
V total stored carbon, rc flow value of storage. 
Different uses have different growth rates
(5) L  = gkV
So
(6)      rcV + α1 p1 gkV + α2 p2 gkV - z
Currently, private sector only focuses on 
private returns
(7)  πi = α1i  Li  p1+ α2i Li p2 - zi
• Social return exceeds private returns as 
a result of value of carbon sequestration
(8) Si = rcVi + πi
When land is shifted from use i to use j, 
∆Sij = rc∆Vij + ∆πij
• = rc ∫ δVijt + ∆πij
Must look not only at change in private 
profitability, but in carbon stored
Can solve for long run equilibrium, and then 
solve backwards for pricing and tax (or 
equivalent, emission target) path
D(p1*) = ΣigiαiVi = ς (p1*, p2*, t*,..)
Where ς is the aggregate supply of energy 
ξ-1(p1* - t*) = C*- CA*  - . χ (p1*, t*).
Incidence Theory
• Incidence theory calculates change in welfare 
of each country (individual) as a result of a 
particular {tax, allocation} scheme
(17)B (t*) = E (p(t*), t*, Uo, G(t*)) + Π(t, p(t), G(t)) –
[ E (p(0), 0, Uo, G(0)) + Π(0, p(0), G(0))]
p(t) is the general equilibrium price vector that 
emerges when the price of carbon is t, Uo is  
the initial level of  utility, and G(t) is the 
“climate” associated with carbon tax t—a 
global public good 
Fact that intervention is welfare enhancing means 
that there exists some allocation such that
(18)Bi (t*) + Ti (t*) > 0 
For all countries
Agreed carbon tax:
(22)Ti (t)  = t e(p (t),t) 
Where e is emission levels
Deviations from Efficiency
Most countries have deviated from relying one a 
single price by subsidizing (e.g. renewables) or 
regulations
How do we explain this?
(a) Reducing distributive burden—can be large 
changes in prices for small allocative effects
(b) Correcting other market failures
(i)  coordination failures
(ii) induced innovation
(iii)  changing preferences? (consumption 
externalities)
Access to Technology
• Important determinant both of efficiency 
and equity
– Patent system restricts the use of knowledge
– Could lead to large transfers of wealth from 
developing to developed countries
– Impediment to reaching a global agreement
– Knowledge is a global public good
– And like other public goods, should be 
financed equitably
• Burden lying on richer countries
National Security
• Borders still make a difference
• Implying countries with large coal deposits will want to 
rely on coal—own energy supplies (energy 
independence)
• Major impediment to reaching a global agreement
• Value of security should be part of incidence analysis
• Illustrates the relationship between different global public 
goods:  the global public good of international security 
(peace) and the global public good of global warming
Concluding Remarks
• World is engaged on risky experiment
• Imperative that there be reductions in emission levels
• But imperative that it be done in ways where the burden 
of adjustment is equitably shared
• Will require new economic model—changed patterns of 
consumption and innovation
– We have treated two scarce goods (air and water) as if they 
were free
– Charging for them will lead to large changes in prices
– Only through changes in patterns of demand will adverse effects 
on developing countries be mitigated
– Increasing reliance on renewables threatens increasing costs of 
energy and food—particularly hard for the poor
• Global Warming is a long run problem
• But it is a problem which needs to be 
attacked now
• Delay will increase the costs
• Delay in agreeing on equitable burden 
sharing will increase the likely inequities 
which will arise.
